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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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WEEKLY REVIEW

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's arrival in Geneva on 10 March coincided with increased Soviet efforts to generate pressure on the Western powers through stepped-up activity in the Berlin air corridors, through renewed warnings of a separate treaty with East Germany, and through continuation of the propaganda campaign aimed at discrediting a US resumption of atmospheric testing. Khrushchev told the Japanese minister in Moscow on 10 March that he had a "dim view" of prospects for success at the 17-nation disarmament conference because of the US attitude.

On 12 March Moscow released Gromyko's favorable replies to UN Acting Secretary General Thant's queries on the Soviet attitude toward signing a convention banning the use of nuclear weapons and toward Sweden's "nonnuclear club" proposal. This move was designed to bring prohibition of both the use and the dissemination of nuclear weapons to the forefront as two paramount issues facing the conference.

Berlin and Germany

On 8 March, two days before Gromyko's arrival in Geneva, the Soviet representative to the Berlin Air Safety Center (BASC) announced plans for 24 Soviet flights on 9 March extending over a six-hour period--the greatest number of such flight plans filed for one day thus far. All these flights were carried out.

On 12 March, the USSR again modified its tactics by conducting four flights at times and altitudes which conflicted with established Western commercial schedules. All previous Soviet corridor flights had been below 7,500 feet, but those on 12, 13, and 15 March were at altitudes normally used by Western commercial transports--7,000-10,000 feet. On the grounds that the ten-minute interval between Soviet and Western flights was insufficient, the Soviet controller in the BASC refused to accept Western flight plans which "conflicted" with Soviet flights.

Moscow apparently hopes that such tactics will preclude all Western commercial flights at altitudes and times of Soviet operations and will demonstrate that existing quadripartite arrangements are inadequate to guarantee air safety in the corridors. In either event, the USSR could then argue that the West must submit to greater Communist control over the corridors than now is implicit in the BASC setup and procedures.

The matter of a separate German peace treaty has been given new emphasis following Mikoyan's renewal of this threat in his 5 March speech at Leipzig. A Pravda article on 9 March reiterated Mikoyan's warning that negotiations could not be used to delay endlessly a treaty which would grant complete authority to the East Germans over all communications to Berlin. An Izvestia article of 11 March similarly argued that it is a "gross miscalculation" to hope

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that the Soviet Union will agree to postpone a peaceful settlement with Germany indefinitely or will take some decision infringing on Communist Germany's "sovereign" rights "even to the slightest extent."

Concurrent with stepped-up activities in the air corridors, the USSR began applying pressure to US army convoys moving along the autobahn between Berlin and West Germany. On 7 and 8 March, Soviet authorities at the autobahn checkpoints attempted to enforce new regulations on US convoys, including a requirement that the number of guards on smaller vehicles be reduced from two to one. After one eastbound convoy had been delayed at Marienborn--on the West German border--with such a demand and then was confronted with a similar demand at Babelsberg--outside West Berlin--the US commander in Berlin ordered the convoy commander to refuse the Soviet request. After a 15-minute delay the convoy was permitted to move on. A Soviet jeep tailed it as far as Babelsberg, where another Soviet vehicle followed it to the Andrews Barracks in West Berlin. This was a new procedure: hitherto, Soviet jeeps have followed convoys through East Germany, but surveillance has halted at the checkpoint. After a two-day lapse, Soviet authorities resumed their harassments on 12 March, when Soviet soldiers at Babelsberg and Marienborn, contrary to custom and agreements, attempted to climb aboard the US vehicles to carry out inspections.

The East Germans reportedly are initiating a further move to support their contention that West Berlin should be a "free city" without political ties with Bonn. A West German newspaper on 13 March noted that West Berliners traveling to foreign countries via West Germany on the East German railroad in three cases have been required to pay for a "transit visa" at the Marienborn checkpoint. In the past, demands for visas have been imposed only on West Berliners traveling to bloc countries. As of September 1960, East Germany and other bloc countries formally refused to accept the use of West German passports by West Berliners, although they continue to recognize identity documents issued by West Berlin municipal authorities.

Disarmament and Test Ban

Moscow has continued its propaganda campaign against the US decision to resume tests. The Soviet press has argued that the decision "casts a sinister shadow" over the 17-nation conference. A 13 March Pravda article referred to the US-Soviet joint statement on disarmament principles last fall and said that while there were "serious" differences, "no international meeting in the past enjoyed the same basis as a starting point in its work." An Izvestia article asserted that "an ever-increasing number of commentators now are inclined to believe that the national system of

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detecting nuclear explosions is quite adequate."

In letters replying to U Thant's queries on the Soviet attitude toward signing a convention banning the use of nuclear weapons, Gromyko reiterated Soviet willingness to sign such an agreement. Gromyko also restated Soviet endorsement of Sweden's non-nuclear club proposal and said the USSR would assume an obligation not to turn over nuclear weapons or information relating to their production to other countries, "provided the US, Britain, and France assume identical obligations." The Soviet letters also inject the question of establishing nuclear free zones in various regions of the world. Nothing is said about controls.

U Thant in early January had sent two letters to each UN member, in compliance with UN resolutions last fall, requesting their attitude toward signing a convention banning the use of nuclear weapons and toward Sweden's nonnuclear club proposal. Replies on the Swedish proposal were requested by 15 March in order to permit him to submit a report to the UN Disarmament Commission by 1 April. The letters expressing views on signing a convention banning the use of nuclear weapons were requested by 1 July in order to give Thant time to prepare a report to the 17th UN General Assembly.

The content and timing of Gromyko's letters, dated 10 March and released by Moscow two days before the scheduled opening of the conference, suggested that one of Moscow's



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primary tactics during the initial phase of the conference would be to press for "partial" disarmament measures which the Soviets claim will strengthen confidence between states and promote agreement on general and complete disarmament. At the 15 March session, Gromyko did present a draft treaty providing for general and complete disarmament in three stages in four years along the lines of the USSR's September 1960 proposals. He also formally expressed Soviet willingness to discuss partial measures to "strengthen confidence between states." (Concurred in by OSI)

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The Soviet party central committee ended its five-day plenary session (5-9 March) without paying apparent attention to bloc problems or foreign policy issues. Agricultural problems were the order of the day; any discussion of other matters was presumably informal and carried on outside the meeting hall.

Khrushchev clearly dominated the scene. He gave both the keynote address and a rather long concluding speech. His proposal for reorganizing the system of management and control in the agricultural sector was a policy innovation comparable to his reorganization of industrial management in 1957 and the Machine-Tractor Station reform in 1958. There was no sign of dissent or reservation about his basic proposals in the remarks of the plenum's 51 speakers--republic and provincial party bosses, agricultural specialists, and heads of governmental agricultural agencies. Although Khrushchev attributed the new organizational scheme to the party presidium as a whole, Soviet citizens will credit the first secretary with it and see its adoption as another demonstration of his leadership.

Unanimity on the basic proposals, however, did not mean slavish acceptance of all details. In his main speech Khrushchev noted, for example, that the "majority" of comrades were in favor of his proposal for interdistrict rather than district agricultural production boards. Estonian party First Secretary Kebin went on record as one of the minority. In his closing remarks Khrushchev emphasized the need for flexibility in meeting local needs and accepted Kebin's view as valid for Estonia and for some other areas with similar problems.

The amount of investment to be made in the agricultural sector, however, was not so easily settled. Reflecting behind-the-scenes apprehension about the implications of his emphasis on the need for greater material support of agriculture, Khrushchev hastened to give assurances that this support would not mean a reallocation of resources "to the detriment of the development of industry or the strengthening of the country's defenses." Clearly, increases in production will have to depend more on efficient use of present resources than on large increases in capital investment. Khrushchev is counting on the new system of management under strict party control to accomplish the task.

The addition of some new resources, however, is being planned. The Seven-Year Plan production target for mineral fertilizers has apparently already been increased from 35 million to 37.7 million metric tons, and Khrushchev, noting in his concluding speech the need for increasing the production of fertilizer, suggested that a central committee plenum or a conference might be held to discuss development of the chemical industry.

The proceedings of the plenum gave added indications that Belorussian party First Secretary Mazurov, a candidate member of the party presidium, and agricultural procurements chief Ignatov, who was dropped from the presidium at the congress in October, may be held responsible for some of last year's agricultural failures. Neither spoke at the plenum, despite the fact that all other republic first secretaries and heads of Soviet agricultural agencies did. Khrushchev was particularly critical of Belorussian agriculture both at the plenum and earlier at an agricultural conference in Minsk, and he has been extremely dissatisfied with the work of the procurements agency for many months.

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****FRANCE-ALGERIA**

A last-minute deadlock on 14 March over the disposition of rebel troops in Algeria held up the expected agreement between the French and the rebel provisional Algerian government (PAG) on a cease-fire announcement. Although Paris expresses confidence that the army will remain loyal and ultimately put down the violence that the Secret Army Organization (OAS) is expected to provoke following announcement of a cease-fire, the government probably realizes it cannot expect full compliance with orders to attack the OAS. If violence is prolonged, and particularly if a general clash between Europeans and Moslems develops, the army may step in as arbiter and demand modifications in De Gaulle's policies.

French Delegate General Morin told the US consul general in Algiers on 12 March that the remaining problem in the negotiations was the actual drafting of a cease-fire announcement. The PAG, he said, had originally reacted favorably to a French suggestion that, once the announcement was made, French troops would maintain order in the cities, while certain areas of the countryside would be controlled by rebel army units. Now, however, the PAG fears that under this arrangement rebel troops would not remain on a war footing, and in certain areas would simply return to their families. It wants French and rebel troops regrouped in specified areas where they would remain under arms.

There may also be disagreement as to who will sign a cease-fire. The rebels reportedly want a French minister to sign for Paris, but the French are said to consider that the agreement would be a military matter and that the signature of a high-ranking army officer would be more appropriate.

French officials in Algiers, who have reportedly launched a propaganda campaign to underline OAS weaknesses, cite the localization of OAS activity in Algiers and Oran and the fact that the accords with the PAG appear

to safeguard the interests of the settlers, as reasons for increased confidence that the post-cease-fire situation can ultimately be controlled. These officials, however, all expect serious disturbances before civil peace can be imposed.

The consensus of several high-ranking and responsible French armed forces officers as reported on 10-11 March is that the services will remain reluctantly loyal to De Gaulle following announcement of a cease-fire in Algeria unless prolonged disorders there or an unexpected event, such as De Gaulle's assassination, opens the way to a military assumption of power.

The officers whose views were reported differed in their predictions of the OAS and settler reactions to a cease-fire announcement, but most agreed that if the security situation in Algeria becomes chaotic, the army will intervene and attempt to impose "conditions" on Paris which could involve a change of regime.

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Meanwhile, the government reportedly expects the OAS to attempt "spectacular" terrorist action in France. The American Embassy in Paris, reporting the numerous recent government deployments of security forces to try to limit terrorism after a cease-fire, observed that the Secret Army Organization has not had too much difficulty in bypassing these forces to get at its targets.

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
CONGO

The meeting in Leopoldville between Tshombé and Adoula--originally scheduled to begin on 15 March--does not seem likely to bring agreement on Katanga's reintegration into the Congo. Tshombé's position in relation to Leopoldville has not significantly weakened: his forces, still including a considerable number of mercenaries, are largely intact, and he has not been deprived of his financial resources. His position in Elisabethville, moreover, might be endangered if he should go too far in accommodating Adoula.

Although the meeting may be delayed as a result of Adoula's sudden and unexplained trip to Coquilhatville on 15 March, there may be some progress when it is held, if for no other reason than that Tshombé wants to prevent a build-up of pressure among the UN military for a "third round" in Katanga. Government leaders in Leopoldville nevertheless are not optimistic. President Kasavubu's recent remarks to Ambassador Guillion that "time will take care of Tshombé" and that "it is imprudent to count on Tshombé's good faith" suggest that Leopoldville has almost written off the Adoula-Tshombé meeting before it begins.

Consul Hoffacker in Elisabethville reports an atmosphere of continuing tension between UN and Katangan forces in which serious incidents could occur at any time. He believes Katangan Minister of Interior Munongo and Foreign Minister Kimba are "clearly up to mischief" and probably determined to prevent Tshombé from any reconciliation with Leopoldville.

The Belgian Union Minière still hesitates to put any real pressure on Tshombé to come to an agreement with Adoula on the division of dividends and tax revenues. Only reluctantly, and after considerable prodding from Ambassador MacArthur and Foreign Minister Spaak, company officials in Brussels agreed to send a letter urging Tshombé to make such an agreement. They remain reluctant, however, to make public either the letter to Tshombé or any reference to the escrow plan to withhold taxes and dividends in a special fund.



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UN sources have indicated they are considering moving three battalions to northern Katanga, presumably to guide and control--but not to support--any attempts by Leopoldville to reassert control there. Such a move would suggest the UN is not expecting any military

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action around Elisabethville and that it has no immediate plans to try to station UN forces at mining centers outside the city.

In the absence of UN logistic support, Adoula's moves to recapture Kongolo in northern Katanga have come to a halt. A US army attaché source who visited Kabalo, south of Kongolo, said the 2,000-2,500 Congolese Army troops there are immobilized by swamps, increasingly hostile Baluba tribesmen, and lack of discipline.

Frustrated by his and the UN's failure to bring Tshombé to heel, by the unwillingness of the Belgian mining interests to get tough with Tshombé, and by the UN's refusal to give him logistic support, Adoula appears to be thinking more seriously of seeking help outside the UN framework. He reportedly plans to dispatch missions to African and Asian countries to try to arrange for bilateral aid. The form of help he seeks is not clear, but one idea apparently is to try to get foreign troops in the Congo now assigned to the UN placed under Leopoldville's control. The chances of favorable reaction to such a request would appear slim at this time. The Congolese missions reportedly will not visit the Communist bloc, but Moscow has offered direct assistance in the form of economic aid and military equipment.

Another indication of Adoula's desire to escape from the UN framework is his renewal of attempts to establish a Congolese air force. If the talks with Tshombé fail to show

good progress, this trend may gain momentum.

Gizenga, the "heir of Lumumba," continues in detention. He is said to be somewhat repentant and to be reading "uplifting" literature.

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Adoula's dismissal of the radical Christophe Gbenye from the Ministry of Interior raised new frictions between radicals and moderates in the government coalition. For the moment Adoula has apparently stymied the formation of a leftist parliamentary coalition against him. Gbenye, after having indicated he would leave the government, has accepted the vice premiership under pressure--possibly only in order to forestall a move against him.

However, Adoula's actions toward Gbenye have raised the threat of a new dissident regime in Stanleyville. Stanleyville and surrounding Orientale Province, although in almost complete administrative and economic chaos, are politically controlled by Gbenye's supporters. A US Embassy official who visited Stanleyville in late February reported that they felt "betrayed" by Adoula, whose close alignment with the US and UN was contrary to Lumumba's policy. General Lundula, who maintains his headquarters in Stanleyville, ostensibly remains loyal to Leopoldville, but UN officials doubt that he would be able to control his troops in any real test.

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LAOS

Souvanna, discouraged by the inability of the contending factions to agree on a coalition government, has threatened to withdraw to Paris if an early settlement is not achieved. The British ambassador met with Souvanna and Souphannouvong at Khang Khay on 10 March for an "exploratory" exchange of views.

He termed the talks "not discouraging," but no substantive accord was reached. He expects further conversations at an early date.

Even if there is an agreement between the Khang Khay factions and the West, however, it is unlikely that Phoumi will

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
support any such coalition. He continues to insist on getting the ministries of defense and interior for his Vientiane faction.

There are indications that a power struggle is taking place within Souvanna's neutralist following at Khang Khay and that left-wing elements are gaining the ascendancy.

Lao pressures after a political settlement.

The military situation has been marked by limited probes by both sides.

There has as yet been no indication of a new Soviet effort to influence the political talks between the rival Laotian factions. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Pushkin, who has been the USSR's top negotiator in the Geneva talks on Laos, did not accompany Gromyko to Geneva,



If Pathet Lao elements should achieve dominance in Souvanna's neutralist group, it is doubtful that Souvanna could resist Pathet

and Soviet Ambassador Abramov has not yet returned to Laos. Soviet propaganda commentary on Laos has been minimal.

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The recent increase in Viet Cong activity is in line with the gradual intensification of the Communist drive in South Vietnam for the past two and a half years. It has been marked by the reappearance of larger forces, numbering from 300 to 500, for the first time since early fall. Their prime targets remain outposts of the Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps in areas where the Viet Cong may be trying to consolidate or link up their bases; increased aggressiveness is evident in several attacks on regular army units and in the heavy casualties suffered on both sides.


For the week ending 5 March, 552 incidents were reported. The locus of action is the southern part of the country. Since late February there have been several attacks at the extreme tip of South Vietnam, in the provinces at the mouth of the Mekong delta, in the jungle regions north of Saigon, and in the rubber plantation areas near the Cambodian border. Government counteroperations in these and other areas have scored some successes with airlifts, airstrikes, and artillery, but they have had little effect on total Viet Cong capability.

The step-up by the Viet Cong may also be intended to counter the impact of increased US military aid to South Vietnam while underscoring the charges of Hanoi, Peiping, and Moscow that such aid imperils peace.

A further indication that the bloc may be maneuvering toward an international conference on Vietnam has been reported by the British consul general in Hanoi. He was recently pressed by a Soviet

Embassy official on the need for the cochairmen of the 1954 Geneva conference--Britain and the USSR--to call such a conference. A recent Chinese Communist Foreign Ministry statement called for consultation among the powers which participated in the 1954 conference. A North Vietnamese memorandum of 28 February advocated reunification elections as outlined in the Geneva agreements, possibly in the hope of drawing neutral support for another conference.

In Saigon, the government is investigating opposition elements possibly associated with the two pilots who bombed the presidential palace on 27 February. Despite conflicting

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stories and persistent reports that some army officers have been arrested, the actual number of detentions appears small and no new repressive measures have been taken.

Another anti-American press campaign, such as that instigated in late November by Diem's brother and political adviser Ngo Dinh Nhu, may be foreshadowed by recent public remarks of Nhu's wife. In a speech on 11 March, obviously directed at the US, Madame Nhu

attacked "pseudo-liberals" in the West who, like the Communists, claim the security problem in South Vietnam is due to the government's lack of popular support; instead, she claimed, it is due solely to "irresponsible" denial in the past of Diem's requests for Western aid to South Vietnam's paramilitary forces. Her remarks suggest that she believes the bombing of the palace was in part provoked by US criticism of the Diem regime.

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PUBLIC ATTITUDES IN COMMUNIST CHINA

The prolonged economic crisis has seriously affected public morale in Communist China. Revolutionary zeal has subsided, even in the lower ranks of the party. Apathy and grumbling against the authorities are common. The food situation is better than a year ago, but is still bad and could worsen before the early harvests in June. Although there were some instances of dissident activity last year, resistance to the Chinese Communists has been largely passive and there are no present signs of organized antiregime action.

The Peasantry

Peiping is especially concerned about peasant attitudes, which have a direct bearing on farm production. Over the past months the peasants have been accorded a number of concessions aimed at increasing their incentive to produce, but they seem to regard these with skepticism and cynicism. One concession, termed the system of "guaranteed production," permits the peasants to keep whatever they produce over

a certain quota; the rub, of course, is how high the quota is set. Also, the regime relaxed controls over private plots--a concession which resulted in a meaningful addition to this winter's food stocks but has led the peasants to neglect "collective production." There are fragmentary indications that winter wheat acreage this year may be down, despite favorable weather conditions.

The peasants seem to be testing how far the regime will go, and Peiping may feel that it has almost exhausted the concessions it can make. Articles attacking "laissez-faire" attitudes and appealing to the peasants to support the collective approach to agriculture have appeared regularly in the local press since the first of the year. Travelers testify that crop stealing remains a common offense.

Conditions in the cities are probably somewhat better, but worker apathy has been evident and industrial production has failed to rally from

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last year's doldrums. The urban intelligentsia has benefited from an atmosphere of relaxation and the current emphasis on production rather than on political reliability. The intellectuals, like their country cousins, are skeptical of the regime's purported new tolerance of the unorthodox.

The Party

Peiping's biggest problem may be the declining morale and increasing corruption among the 17,000,000 party members. Over 80 percent joined subsequent to the Communist take-over of the mainland and consequently have not been--in the words of Liu Shao-chi--"steeled in revolutionary struggle." Most of the late-comers enrolled with great expectations, only to encounter hardships and to be blamed repeatedly for policy failures. Recent resignations from membership suggest that to be among the party cadre may no longer be regarded by all as a mark of distinction; Peiping has felt the need to point out in its propaganda that "it is not a shameful thing to be a cadre."

The party has been plagued with corruption to an increasing degree since economic conditions began to deteriorate in 1960, and now is once again engaged in an intensive campaign to reassert discipline and close the gulf between those at lower levels who implement party policy and those at the top who proclaim it. Since early this year the Peiping press has called attention to "independent kingdoms"--a euphemism for the separation of territorial units from the party center and a reference to the Kao Kang purge of 1953-54 which will not be missed by the party faithful.

The Army and Security Forces

Early in 1961 when malnutrition spread to the army and officials were discussing "the big hurdle of the first half of the year" before the harvest--the same situation Peiping now faces--the military affairs committee issued instruction after instruction on how to improve morale. A campaign to recount the hardships of the revolutionary past was launched in order by contrast to minimize the sufferings of the present.

this campaign was relatively successful and questioning of regime policy diminished, at least temporarily.

The problem apparently persists, however, since Peiping is continuing its intensive political indoctrination of the troops. In mid-1961 Peiping changed its military recruitment policy and for the first time conscripted urban rather than rural youths into the army, possibly in the belief that the political reliability of city dwellers might prove better than that of the peasants. Contacts between the armed forces personnel and the civilian population are being kept to a minimum to avoid unnecessary friction and resentment. Although morale has certainly declined, there is no indication of disloyalty. (Con-

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SOVIET AND CHINESE AID TO NEPAL

Although Soviet and Chinese Communist aid programs in Nepal made progress in the past year, they continue to encounter difficulties because of the rudimentary conditions of the country. Both Peiping and Moscow have granted concessions to cope with Nepal's weakness, but the ways in which each has handled this problem reveal the differences between Chinese and Soviet interests in the region.

The Chinese are just getting started on the implementation of a program initiated in 1956, and they will probably move more rapidly now as part of an overall effort to strengthen China's ties with Nepal in competition with India and the US--Katmandu's two main sources of foreign assistance. The Soviet Union, restrained by its ties with India, appears reluctant to become involved in any major undertaking in Nepal but has extended some aid in order not to leave the bloc's effort there entirely to the Chinese.

Even though almost all Communist aid has been in the form of outright grants covering the foreign-exchange costs of equipment and technical aid, Nepal must still find funds for the local costs of the projects involved. Katmandu's inability and unwillingness to raise the required revenue led to requests to both the USSR and China for cash or commodities to generate the necessary local currency. The Chinese promptly complied, doubtless viewing this as a simple way to stimulate trade by marketing their goods in cooperation with the Nepali Government.

The USSR, always reluctant to depart from its normal forms of economic aid and with no prospects for trade with Nepal,

bargained for nearly a year before grudgingly agreeing to supply a small amount of currency and goods on a loan basis, as well as some goods as a gift, all of which will be used for local financing.

Under a \$7,500,000 aid grant of 1959, the USSR is building a small hospital in Katmandu, has started a hydroelectric plant, and has plans for a sugar mill and a cigarette factory. Soviet engineers in 1959-60 carried out a preliminary survey for a major East-West road extending across the entire length of Nepal. A detailed survey on the eastern half of the road was finished in May 1961, but a team of Soviet technicians scheduled to complete the survey has never arrived. Recently the Nepali Government announced that it will complete the survey itself and is seeking foreign and domestic funds for eventual construction of the road. Persistent reports that the Soviet Union was offering to build, as well as survey, the road apparently were false, as Moscow seems unwilling to become involved in such an extensive operation.

According to an agreement signed last September intended to implement two aid grants of 1956 and 1960 totaling \$33,600,000, the Chinese are to build a cement factory, a paper mill, and a leather tanning and shoe factory, and to install a small electric power plant in Nepal during the next five years. All of these projects are in the initial stages; the first two have been under consideration since 1956.

Far more important for its strategic implications is the agreement signed during King Mahendra's visit to China last October which provides for the Chinese to supply some \$9,800,000

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worth of equipment, materials, and technical assistance for a road linking the Tibetan border with Katmandu. The arrival of Chinese technicians to begin studying the project has been expected for several weeks, but so far there is no indication of their presence. Disagreement over the proposed route may account for at least part of the delay.

Although Nepali Foreign Minister Giri has hinted in the

context of requests for Western materiel that the bloc has offered military aid, there is almost no Soviet or Chinese activity in this field. The USSR recently agreed to supply two MI-4 helicopters on credit, however, and the Chinese have promised three small AN-2 utility transport aircraft. China also recently supplied the Nepali Army with several field radio sets. 25X1
(Prepared by ORR)

BRITISH GUIANA

London is planning a formal investigation of the riots of 16 February, and British Guiana's independence is almost certain to be delayed at least until early 1963. In agreeing to the investigation, Premier Jagan evidently understood that this would probably delay the constitutional conference planned for May which was to have scheduled the independence date. Recent colonial conferences have set such dates at least six months after the conference.

In the aftermath of the riots, sentiment for postponement of independence is growing among many people in British Guiana who fear the establishment of an East Indian police state along Communist lines. Chief opposition leader Forbes Burnham, while still on record as demanding independence this year, is said to favor a delay in order to strengthen his own party. Moreover, he fears further violence between East Indian and Negro elements--violence from which his party, based on the less numerous Negroes, could only suffer in the long run.

The US consul general in Georgetown believes that both Burnham's People's National Congress and Jagan's People's Progressive party have lost much prestige. The riots revealed

Jagan's dependence on British military support to control the country in a crisis, and Burnham failed to press the demonstrations in a sufficiently determined and coherent manner to oust Jagan, whose four-seat legislative majority has held firm.

With politics now on an openly racial basis, the small conservative third party, the multiracial United Force, is even more isolated than before. No effective challenger to either Jagan's or Burnham's leadership has yet appeared, however, and the consul general believes the only chance for stable government in the colony lies in the ultimate replacement of Jagan by a new grouping of moderate political elements from all three parties.

With the country's economy set back for years by the destruction in Georgetown, Jagan is renewing efforts to seek Soviet trade and aid. He has received the Czech commercial counselor from Brazil, sent missions to the Soviet bloc, and announced that projects have been discussed with several Communist countries and that construction of factories is likely to be arranged soon. London presumably would not object to trade arrangements but has indicated it would prevent acceptance of any bloc loan. 25X1

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****COMMUNIST PLANS FOR GUERRILLA WARFARE IN VENEZUELA**

The Venezuelan Communists have apparently decided to resort to guerrilla tactics to undermine President Betancourt's coalition regime, having failed to oust him through an extensive campaign of urban violence last January. Their plans are timed to take advantage of the government's recent loss of its majority in the lower house of Congress following the defection in January of a leftist group in Betancourt's Democratic Action party, and the collaboration of this group--which now styles itself the New Democratic Action--with other opposition parties in Congress.

The Venezuelan Communist party (PCV) has long been training a small paramilitary organization of some 200 to 300, and has received Cuban support for guerrilla activity. [REDACTED]

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Earlier this month the press reported the government's capture of a large number of leftist guerrillas, along with sizable quantities of arms and Cuban propaganda advocating the overthrow of Betancourt by guerrilla action.

Apart from Cuban aid, the Communists have several advantages for guerrilla activity. They can count on favorable terrain in a number of mountainous regions, on the fact that many Communist-leftist groups possess small arms, and on poor transportation and communications to obstruct government countermeasures. They may also get some cooperation from leftist guerrillas in neighboring Colombia.

Even sporadic guerrilla operations, combined with legislative obstruction by the opposition in Congress, could partly disrupt agrarian reform--the keystone of Betancourt's socio-economic program. The government's concern is indicated by recent extensive arrests of leftists and Communists, by a systematic effort by security forces to uncover arms illegally held by civilians, and by measures to halt alleged contraband arms shipments into Venezuela.

Betancourt has widespread support among the peasants, whose cooperation would be needed by the Communists for successful conduct of guerrilla warfare on any sizable scale.

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

PERU

Political tensions are increasing with the approach of the 10 June presidential election. The leading candidate at present is Victor Raul Haya de la Torre, founder of the leftist but anti-Communist APRA.

Indians to attack troops sent to drive them off private property--Peruvian-owned haciendas--and several Indians were shot.

The Communists in Lima, claiming that the Indians had been driven from land owned by the Cerro de Pasco Corporation, a US-owned mining company, organized a

The APRA party (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana) was founded in 1924 by Victor Raul Haya de la Torre. Intended to be international in scope, with a thorough radical socio-economic reform program for all "Indo-America" (Haya's term for Latin America), it survived as a political entity only in Peru. Revolutionary and leftist but never Communist, APRA was involved in many bloody clashes with the Peruvian Army during the 1920s and 1930s, and senior officers retain a deep hatred of the party. APRA gained respectability by supporting the conservative Manuel Prado's successful presidential campaign in 1956, and has been his tacit congressional ally for the past six years.

non-APRA candidates, such as ex-dictator Manuel Odria and able but unpopular former prime minister Pedro Beltran, have been conducting a whispering campaign to publicize the armed forces' anti-APRA attitude and play on the fears of many conservative Peruvians that an APRA victory would lead to extensive expropriation.

The Communists have taken advantage of the present administration's desire to reduce antigovernment sentiment during the campaign period. The government has made increasingly conciliatory responses to demands of several irresponsible labor unions, particularly in controversies involving US-owned companies. Communist agitators incited the usually docile highland

"demonstration of protest" which degenerated into an anti-US riot. The rioters, predominantly members of the Communist-dominated Federation of Bank Employees (FEB), were subdued with tear gas and clubs. Subsequently when an FEB organizer was forcibly ejected from a restricted area of the Lima branch of the National City Bank of New York, where he had gone to harangue the non-FEB employees, the Communists agitated for the deportation of the three US citizens who ejected him.

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CANADA

Prime Minister Diefenbaker is expected to call a general election some time in the next six months. He evidently hopes to capitalize on Canada's continuing economic upturn--marked by a seasonally adjusted unemployment rate of only 5.9 percent, compared with last year's recession high of 7.8 percent. Polls and recent by-elections, however, suggest that the opposition Liberals have at least an even chance of ousting him. His Progressive Conservative government, which holds 204 of 265 seats in the House of Commons, is clearly on the defensive and is trying to smooth over sharp intracabinet differences.

Elections are not mandatory until March 1963, but a pre-election atmosphere is evident. Diefenbaker is going out of his way to demonstrate his government's independent approach on foreign policy and defense questions. Displeased by the proceedings against Cuba at Punte del Este, Ottawa appears further than ever from joining the OAS. Diefenbaker is reiterating his unwillingness to curb trade with Cuba further, maintaining that no strategic goods have been shipped. Nevertheless, there is growing uneasiness in some press and high opposition circles over the advisability of continuing such trade, by which Havana obtains badly needed spare parts. Its imports from Canada totaled about \$32,000,000 last year.

Large grain sales to Communist China--some \$220,000,000 worth since January 1961--have won the government support from the prairie states, and current reluctance to continue sales at the same level is based only on an anticipated shortage of supply, not on any ideological considerations.

On the question of nuclear weapons, Diefenbaker so far has felt obliged to defer publicly to Foreign Minister Green's obsession with disarmament and unwillingness for Canada to take any action which might hinder progress toward an international agreement. Nevertheless, growing public dissatisfaction with the government's long-standing indecision on the acquisition of nuclear weapons is being exploited by the Liberals in aggressive parliamentary questioning.

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

SPECIAL ARTICLES

CUBA'S POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

The imposition of Communist political institutions in Cuba was very rapid during the second half of 1961, and the structure of the state for all practical purposes now is patterned after Soviet bloc party and governmental organization. A single political machine professing Marxist-Leninist principles and having functions and leadership interlocked with those of state organs, has assumed the leading role in the formulation of government policy. Government at the provincial and local levels was completely reorganized last year.

Party Structure

On 26 July 1961, Fidel Castro announced that the United Party of the Socialist Revolution (PURS) would be formed as the single party of revolutionary Cuba. Pending official formation of the PURS, Castro explained, the Integrated Revolutionary Organizations (ORI) would develop the bases on which the new party would be built. The ORI resulted from a merger of the Popular Socialist party (PSP), which was the Cuban Communists' old, disciplined, and fairly large party, and two amorphous and nearly defunct "revolutionary" organizations--Castro's 26th of July Movement (M26J) and the Revolutionary Directorate (DR), a student organization. This "unification of revolutionary forces" had been urged at the PSP's eighth national congress in August 1960 and became a reality a year later. No date

has been announced for the emergence of the PURS from the ORI.

Membership in the ORI is limited to the revolutionary elite, who are to be the "vanguard of the dictatorship of the proletariat." Membership is to be a requisite for any positions of economic or political importance. Che Guevara has described the ORI as "the political motor of the entire country." One of the ORI's first major activities has been the training of a cadre through a network of Basic Schools for Revolutionary Training throughout the country.

The ORI National Directorate is the supreme policy-making body in Cuba. Of its 25 members--announced on 9 March--ten are veteran leaders of the PSP, ten were prominent in the M26J, and one was a leader of the DR. The remaining four members are not known to have been affiliated with any particular group, but all have long been close to the PSP and to Fidel Castro. They, as well as the ten M26J leaders, include some individuals believed for some years to be crypto-Communists.

The directorate's leader, at least nominally, is Fidel Castro, but veteran Communist Blas Roca has become the most authoritative spokesman on ORI matters. President Dorticos has an important role, as does long-time Communist leader Carlos Rafael Rodriguez. The

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****NATIONAL DIRECTORATE OF CUBA'S
INTEGRATED REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS**

The Integrated Revolutionary Organizations (ORI) resulted from a merger of the Communist Popular Socialist Party (PSP), Fidel Castro's 25th of July Movement (1961), and the Revolutionary Directorate (DR), a student organization. The leaders of these organizations are among the members of the National Directorate--the nucleus for policy-making--and was and the principal officers of the National Institute of Agrarian Reform (INRA), the Revolutionary Cuban Veterans' Central (CRCV), and the Central Planning Board (CEPLAN), the top-level governmental body which coordinates the activities of the provincial and municipal boards for Coordination, Execution, and Inspection (JUCEI).

MEMBERS OF ORI NATIONAL DIRECTORATE	GOVERNMENT AND OTHER POSITIONS	PRIOR POLITICAL PARTY POSITIONS
Fidel CASTRO Ruz	Prime minister, president of JUCEPLAN, armed forces commander in chief	Titular head of M26J
Raul CASTRO Ruz	Minister of armed forces, vice-president of JUCEPLAN, chief of the Oriente JUCEI	M26J leader
Ernesto "Che" GUEVARA	Minister of industries	M26J leader
Oswaldo DORTICOS Torrado	President of Cuba	Uncertain
Blas ROCA Calderia	--	Secretary general of the PSP since 1935
Emilio ARAGONES	--	M26J national coordinator
Carlos Rafael RODRIGUEZ	President of INRA, director of the PSP daily <u>Hoy</u>	Member, PSP executive committee
Augusto MARTINEZ Sanchez	Minister of labor	M26J leader
Anibal ESCALANTE Dellunde	--	Member, PSP executive committee; PSP secretary for organization
Faure CHOMON	Ambassador to the USSR	Leader of the DR
Ramiro VALDES Menendez	Minister of interior	M26J leader
Severo AGUIRRE Cristo	Production chief of INRA	Member, PSP executive committee
Flovio BRAVO Farco	Director of commission on political control of the militia	Member, PSP central committee
Cesar ESCALANTE Dellunde	--	Member, PSP executive committee
Joaquin ORDOQUI Mesa	--	Member, PSP executive committee
Lazaro FENA Gonzalez	Secretary general of CTC-R and a vice-president of the WFTU	Member, PSP executive committee
Manuel LUZARDO Garcia	--	Member, PSP central committee
Ramon CALCINES Cordillo	--	PSP youth leader and expert on foreign affairs
Major Juan ALMEIDA	Army chief of staff	M26J leader
Armando HART Davalos	Minister of education	M26J leader
Major Sergio DEL VALLE	Army General Staff officer	M26J leader
Major Guillermo GARCIA Frias	Army General Staff officer	Uncertain
Osmani CIENFUEGOS	Minister of public works	Uncertain
Raul CURBELO Morales	Minister of communications	Uncertain
Haydee SANTAMARIA de HART	Director of Casa de las Americas	M26J leader

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principle of "collective leadership" has been evoked by Castro, but in even stronger terms by Blas Roca.

Provincial ORI units have been formed in each of the six provinces and in most if not all of the country's 126 municipios (local units similar to counties or townships). Provincial and national assemblies are apparently envisaged as--theoretically--the highest party organs on those levels. The only provincial ORI assembly held so far was in December 1961 in Oriente Province.

National Government Structure

Executive and legislative authority is formally vested in the Council of Ministers, or cabinet. With the assumption by ORI of the policy-making function, the Council of Ministers is to a considerable extent reduced to the role of a body of technicians. The Central Planning Board (JUCEPLAN) is the top-level governmental body, with greater power than the Council of Ministers. The JUCEPLAN was formed in late 1960 in order, according to government announcement, to formulate and implement basic policies for the development of the national economy. It has since also assumed politico-administrative functions and is the central coordinating agency for the newly established provincial and municipal Boards for Coordination, Execution, and Inspection (JUCEI), which have supplanted the former

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provincial and local governments.

JUCEPLAN'S president is Fidel Castro, and its vice president is Raul Castro. Blas Roca and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez are key members. Ex officio members include nine cabinet ministers and a delegate of the National Institute of Agrarian Reform (INRA).

Provincial and Local Government

Local JUCEI, formed or in the process of formation in all 126 municipios, are subject to and represented in the appropriate provincial JUCEI, which in turn are subordinate to the JUCEPLAN. Blas Roca described the JUCEI in August 1961 as "a new form of state power"--a step forward in the "direct establishment of the power of the people over the entire country." Raul Castro, a month earlier, said they are "state bodies, politico-administrative instruments of revolutionary power...the life-nerve of the revolution and of the new revolutionary state."

The provincial JUCEI consist of a "congress," which is apparently to convene periodically; a "plenum" of perhaps 30 representatives of various political and economic groups in the province and delegates from the ministries of the national government; a permanent committee; and a secretariat. The permanent committee is, in practice, the dominant organ on the provincial level. The chairmen of the JUCEI provincial permanent committees are, generally, individuals not specifically identified as

Communists and are frequently military men with some local popularity as rebel leaders who fought with Castro against the Batista dictatorship. Actual power, however, appears to be exerted by the secretaries general of the permanent committees, who are ORI provincial leaders and veteran Communists.

The Mass Organizations

The numerous organizations established or reorganized during the past year, usually identified as mass organizations, constitute a primary instrument of the government in mobilizing and indoctrinating the population and in attempting to transmit a sense of dedication and identification with the regime. Most Cubans now are probably directly or indirectly associated with one or more such organizations.

The Revolutionary Cuban Workers' Central (CTC-R) is based on the 23-year-old Confederation of Cuban Workers but was completely reorganized under Communist leadership last November and converted into a vertical organization with components based on industry or place of work rather than on craft or trade. Its claimed 1,300,000 members are being subjected to a concerted campaign for "socialist emulation," and many are being asked to "volunteer" for wage reductions, extra hours of work, and cane-cutting details.

The Association of Rebel Youth (AJR) was formed in October 1960 with the absorption by the youth sector of the

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Communist party of four other youth groups. Its estimated 100,000 members have been exceptionally useful to the regime, participating in great numbers in the militia, the voluntary labor battalions, and the "literacy brigades" which went out to the countryside last year as part of the regime's effort to eradicate illiteracy. The Union of Rebel Pioneers is the junior version of the AJR for children between 6 and 13. The Federation of Cuban Women, with a claimed membership of 166,000, has played a leading role under Raul Castro's wife, Vilma Espin, in the establishment of day nurseries to release mothers for work in the fields and factories, in the establishment of sewing and tailoring schools, and in the literacy campaign.

In addition to its role as an active military force, the militia has been one of the most pervasive mass organizations in the mobilization and indoctrination of the population. There are about 200,000 militia members--both men and women--in the ready reserve and home guard, including many who otherwise would have been unemployed.

Much of the rural population has been organized through the new economic entities--the cooperatives and state farms--as well as through the militia and other mass organizations. Even the remaining small landowners are being forced into an organization which makes their independence only nominal.

Castro's Position and Role

Fidel Castro has never been an effective administrator,

and only during brief periods has he played an active role in the day-to-day business of government. His power has been based on his personality, particularly his extraordinary ability to engender enthusiasm in the masses. Early in his regime he came to depend on others as administrators and organizers. His progressive personal identification with Marxism-Leninism led him to rely increasingly on the Communists.

Although Castro's personality and temperament are such that he will not easily adapt himself to the principle of collective leadership, the requirements of governmental unity will probably dictate an accommodation when and if disputes arise between Castro and the Communist leadership. There is no confirmation of rumors that their relationship has seriously deteriorated or that a disruptive struggle for power is underway. It is unlikely that the Communists have any intention or desire to remove Castro as the valuable popular rallying point for the regime.

An attempt to explain Castro's replacement on 14 February as president of the National Institute for Agrarian Reform by Carlos Rafael Rodriguez was made in an editorial in the Communist daily newspaper Hoy, which is directed by Rodriguez. The editorial described Castro as "the great captain of our victories" and said the job change was to "free Comrade Fidel from some of the administrative obligations" in order to give him more time "to devote to the general battle, of continental as well as national importance, for the full and final triumph of socialism in our country."

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****OPPOSITION FORCES IN IRAQ**

The Qasim regime in Iraq is the target of a number of opposition forces--ethnic, religious, and ideological. In many instances these groupings overlap each other and their objectives vary. So far, Qasim has remained in power by playing off one group against another and by instituting tight security precautions backed by the army--the only group which, for the most part, has remained loyal.

Opposition of Ethnic Or Religious Groups

The heterogeneous make-up of Iraq's population itself encourages opposition to the government. The country's estimated 800,000 Kurds have long regarded the central government as an alien force which has thwarted their aspirations for a Kurdish state. Since last summer an important segment of the Kurds has been in open

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revolt. Despite a punitive force sent against them last summer and continued aerial bombing throughout the winter, Mullah Mustafa al-Barzani's rebellious tribesmen remain undefeated. They control a considerable area in mountainous northeastern Iraq and are a potential nucleus for an extensive Kurdish rebellion. Tribal rivalries so far have prevented the formation of a united Kurdish opposition. However, there is much latent sympathy among Kurds for the Mullah's cause.

The great majority of Iraqi Arabs are Moslems, but they are divided along sectarian lines into Shias and Sunnis. The 1,250,000 Sunni Arabs, politically dominant since the days of the Ottoman Empire, regard themselves as superior to their Sunni Kurdish and Shia Arab coreligionists. The Shias, numbering about 3,800,000 and concentrated in southeastern Iraq, are mostly farmers. Shia resentment of the Sunnis is strong, and the influence of conservative religious leaders is much deeper than among the Sunnis. These leaders, called mujtahids, have consistently opposed what they regard as Qasim's pro-Soviet and pro-Communist leanings.

In addition, Shia religious conservatism has tended to create sympathy for Jordan's King Husayn because of his direct descent from the Prophet Mohammed. This sympathy has been utilized by Husayn in his anti-Qasim efforts among certain tribal leaders of the lower Euphrates Valley, although Husayn's marriage to an English

girl is said to have diminished his popularity there. Much of the plotting among bedouin sheiks can be categorized as an endemic pastime, but those in Iraq have lost much influence and land since the 1958 coup because of their support of the former royal regime.

The success of a tribal uprising in the Euphrates Valley, unless accompanied by disorders in the remainder of the country, is extremely dubious. Lightly armed tribesmen have been no match against Iraq's army and air force in the past, although tribal revolt might spark a coup effort by other disgruntled elements.

Qasim's Political Opponents

There is opposition to Qasim in every political grouping in the country. His failure to carry out his promise of a return to constitutional government and to hold parliamentary elections has dismayed all politically conscious elements. Ideological differences have also cost him support.

Opposition to Qasim among the Communists is centered in the Ittihad al-Shab faction, which was outlawed after Qasim gave his blessing to a splinter group led by an acquaintance. The outlawed faction has wavered between support for and opposition to the regime since it was founded. At present it is bitterly criticizing Qasim for alleged favoritism to Arab nationalist elements. Rigged elections in the teachers' association early this year gave the victory to these elements, and the Ittihad al-Shab group

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in reaction has increased its attacks on the Iraqi prime minister personally. Inasmuch as the Communists probably are fearful that the prime minister's overthrow would eventually redound to their own disadvantage, however, it seems unlikely that they would move decisively against him unless he were to persecute the party actively. However, they will continue their attacks.

Among Qasim's most vehement opponents are the pan-Arabist and socialist Baathists. It was the Baath that carried out the nearly successful assassination attempt against Qasim in October 1959.

Reports from Baghdad during the past several months indicate

another conspiracy led by retired Col. Tahir Yahya, the first chief of security under Qasim.

The Army

Information regarding the extent of anti-Qasim plotting in the army is meager. However, at least two dissident groups are believed to exist, aside from those connected with the Yahya group and the Baathists. Officers in the Basra area in southern Iraq have been reported to harbor strong anti-Qasim feelings and at one time were said to be planning Qasim's assassination. Their enmity may, in part, stem from his campaign against the Kurds, since many Kurdish units have been transferred to southern Iraq out of Kurdish territory.

Should Qasim order a major anti-Kurdish campaign this spring when the snows melt in the mountains, and should the campaign bog down or the army suffer reverses, army leaders might decide that Qasim must be removed in order to wipe out the loss of face and to avert what could be a long-drawn-out and inconclusive campaign.

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****SOVIET BLOC PROBLEMS WITH STUDENTS FROM UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES**

Treatment of students from the underdeveloped countries by bloc governments and peoples gives rise to a multitude of complaints, and Western diplomatic missions in the USSR and Eastern Europe are frequently approached by students with requests for assistance in obtaining scholarships in the West. Last December the Czechoslovak police seized a Somali student in Prague, placed him on a Czechoslovak airliner, and dumped him penniless and without luggage in Cairo. This was the climax of a month and a half's effort by the student, once considered by Western observers a convinced Communist, and five of his countrymen to leave Czechoslovakia for West Germany and Great Britain in the hope of securing scholarships to continue their studies in the West. The Somalis had been studying in Czechoslovakia for up to three years and were thoroughly disheartened by what they had encountered.

Although this dramatic expulsion is not typical of the bloc's treatment of students from abroad, it underlines the fact that the bloc's program to win support from the emerging intelligentsia of the newly independent states is at best a qualified success. There is no reliable estimate of the number of these students in Eastern Europe, but each of the satellites probably has 250 or more and the USSR approximately 2,000 in universities and vocational schools.

Sources of Dissatisfaction

Some of the students in Eastern Europe on bloc scholarships were sent against their wishes. For example, students from Mali, where government approval for accepting a scholar-

ship is required, feel they have to accept a proffered bloc scholarship or risk being refused other scholarship opportunities. Almost all bloc scholarships are offered through cultural exchange agreements, in which case the underdeveloped state nominates the recipients, or through the bloc-sponsored International Union of Students--a device for extending aid to "progressives" unlikely to be chosen for scholarships by their own governments.

Upon arrival in a bloc state, the prospective student sometimes finds that he is not permitted to take the course of study he wishes. A Togolese student in Hungary, for example, was pressured into premedical studies, although he was interested in engineering. Some foreign students in the USSR have been handicapped in electing subjects of their choice because these subjects involved "state secrets."

Next, the student must take an intensive course in the language of his host country--a language some feel will be of no use once they have completed their studies. In Rumania, students have also been compelled to take courses in Rumanian literature and history, which they consider burdensome and useless. A course on the history of the Communist party required for foreign students on scholarships in the USSR proved so unpopular among Asians and Africans studying in Kiev that they have been allowed to cut class at will. It is still required in some other educational institutions, however, and remains a sore point for many foreign students.

The scholarship stipends provided the foreign students

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are large by local standards and normally considerably in excess of those granted by the East Europeans to native students. In Rumania, for instance, the scholarships exceed the average daily industrial wage. Nevertheless, foreign students generally consider these stipends less than adequate. They can earn outside fees for radiobroadcasts and newspaper articles in support of regime propaganda, but some find this distasteful.

Major and Minor Irritants

Once in residence, the students encounter a variety of major and minor irritants. Many of these students come from relatively wealthy families and are appalled at the primitive living conditions they encounter, such as having hot water only two days a week or occupying a small room with three other students. Indonesians studying near Frunze in the USSR expressed horror over what they considered the desperate state of some Soviet citizens belonging to Central Asian minority groups who were observed living in caves in the mountainsides and in dugouts.

Foreign students in Czechoslovakia believe the mail they send home is censored, and claim that sometimes it does not arrive at all. In Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and probably other satellites, the foreign students are quartered with trusted satellite students who, the visitors feel, keep tabs on them and attempt to indoctrinate them. Complaints over police surveillance have been voiced by students in most East European states. The Indonesians in Frunze refer to the USSR

as the land of "Nelzya"--it is forbidden."

Bloc governments frown on student contacts with the West. Visits to Western embassies are discouraged, even if the students are only seeking texts in languages they can understand. Ghanaian students in Kiev tried unsuccessfully for six months to communicate with the Ghanaian Embassy in Moscow last spring and were able to do so only after a serious incident involving African students. Also, the students are involuntarily roused out on special occasions, such as the death of Patrice Lumumba, to demonstrate in front of Western embassies. Scholarship students in the Soviet Union have also complained about being expected to work in the fields without pay at harvest time.

Racial Discrimination

Since the foreign students are given preferential treatment, they are resented by East European students and citizens who often shun them. Generally, the visiting students complain about their isolation and inability to meet the people.

Sometimes this resentment has racial overtones. A Zanzibari student in Poland was deeply upset when he found an offensive poster on his dormitory bulletin board. In East Germany, students in the company of white girls have been offended by the remarks of passers-by. Some African students in the USSR, especially those studying in Kiev, have commented that they are reluctant to attend social gatherings, since "it always

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results in an unpleasant incident." [REDACTED]

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Bloc Policy

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Student Reaction

When disillusionment appears in a given country's student delegation, factionalism within the group occasionally develops between the dyed-in-the-wool Communists and the mere fellow-travelers and nationalists. This situation arose last year among the 55 Iraqi students in Rumania. Twenty-two apparently left the country in March after knife fights occurred frequently enough for them to become concerned about their personal safety.

Some students suspect that the diplomas they receive are "paper degrees" which will not be worth much outside the bloc. In Poland, one student drew this conclusion because he felt the students from his own country were not intellectually capable of grasping the material the Poles were willing to teach them. Courses in the special People's Friendship University, established in Moscow for Asians, Africans, and Latin Americans, are for four to five years, as opposed to the five to six years required in other Soviet educational institutions. This disparity, as well as the low educational level of some of the students, has led to doubts about the value of the university's degrees.

With the realization of the programs' shortcomings, the bloc states can be expected to try to improve them with such measures as establishing separate universities--as the USSR has already done and as Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia are in the process of doing. Moscow's People's Friendship University, which opened in 1960 with an enrollment of 600, now has 1,286 students and has announced plans for an eventual 4,000-5,000. Additional special centers for foreign students are being established in Kiev and Tashkent.

While reports on education in Eastern Europe come only from students who found the experience disappointing, many of the irritants they encountered appear inherent to education in the bloc. This suggests that the presence of foreign students will continue to be a mixed blessing to the Communist regimes.

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